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ABSTRACT 
Exploration is both an important part of a firm’s innovation strategy and an activity that involves 
a high degree of uncertainty. This paper investigates a duality in the exploratory component of 
R&D activity with regard to innovation failure: while exploration is likely to increase firms’ 
exposure to failure, it might also provide learning opportunities to reduce failure. Our study 
contributes to the innovation management and organisational learning literatures by 
demonstrating the value of exploratory R&D for enabling two types of learning mechanisms. The 
first, experience-based learning, is based on the learning opportunities derived from accumulated 
experience in exploratory R&D: it involves improvements to procedures associated with 
experimentation and provides guidance for current exploration and to navigate the search space. 
The second, inferential-based learning, is based on the learning opportunities derived from 
current exploratory R&D efforts, which are associated with improved interpretation of ill-defined 
problems and timely responses to unstructured information. We draw on a longitudinal dataset of 
2,226 Spanish manufacturing companies and show that, when past experience is associated with 
current exploration, innovation failure in the conception phase is reduced. We also find an 
inverted U-shaped relation between current exploratory R&D and innovation failure, in both the 
conception and implementation phases of innovation projects, showing that increasing levels of 
investment in current exploration activities attenuate the initial positive association between 
exploratory R&D and failure.  
 
 
Keywords: exploration; innovation failure; learning; research and development
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Exploration is an important part of the strategies of firms striving to bring to market new 
products and processes that promise large revenues if they are difficult to imitate by 
competitors. In this sense, firms’ exploration activities are essential to achieve sustained 
competitive advantage (March, 1991). However, while firms need to explore in order to build 
and retain their competitive edge, they need also to learn how to manage the greater level of 
uncertainty and risk involved in highly explorative innovation activity (Edmondson, 2011).  
This is not an easy balance to achieve. Although firms want to minimise failure related to 
innovation-related activities such as exploration (Desai, 2010), they may be willing to tolerate 
some level of failure if the exploration activity provides valuable new knowledge and learning 
opportunities that are aligned to their innovation strategy (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Edmondson, 
2011). However, despite the increasing interest in organisational learning from failure 
(Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Madsen & Desai, 2010; Desai, 2015) and the organisational 
costs associated with the termination of R&D projects (Shepherd et al., 2014), very little 
research focuses specifically on the relationship between exploratory R&D and innovation 
failure.  
The present study investigates the relationship between exploratory R&D and failure in 
innovation projects. We examine the learning potential from two sources of information and 
knowledge gained in firms’ exploration activities that can contribute to lowering the risks of 
failure associated with exploratory R&D. The first is the firm’s accumulated experience in 
exploration (i.e. experience-based learning from past exploration). Prior experience affects 
the articulation of search routines and helps to identify the relevant search space (Nelson & 
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Winter, 1982). Moreover, when applied to current activities, previously elaborated schemes 
can be refined to improve understanding about the underlying causes of problems in 
innovation-related activities (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011). The second source is the 
learning opportunities derived from concurrent exploration efforts, which emerge when a 
significant amount of (unstructured) information collected en route enables better 
interpretation of ill-defined problems and more timely response to them (inferential-based 
learning from current exploration) (Cook & Brown, 1999). Specifically, we investigate the 
following interrelated questions. First, we investigate whether, and to what extent, firms can 
benefit from accumulated experience in exploration activities and, in particular, whether there 
are positive complementarities with current exploration activities in terms of reducing 
innovation failure. Second, we investigate whether the scale of current explorative R&D 
contributes to reducing the likelihood of innovation failure. To address these research 
questions we use longitudinal data, covering the period 2007-2012, on a sample of 2,226 
manufacturing firms derived from the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) and 
exploit information on firms’ expenditure on the exploratory component of R&D, and the 
probability of failed innovation activity. 
This paper contributes to the organisational learning and innovation management literatures 
by shedding new light on the mechanisms that allow firms to gain valuable learning from 
exploratory R&D. To the best of our knowledge, the relation between exploratory R&D 
activities and innovation failure has not been tested explicitly. We aim to fill this gap and to 
challenge the conventional wisdom that recognises exploration as a high risk activity but 
ignores the learning opportunities that it provides. These learning opportunities improve the 
effectiveness of the exploration activities and attenuate the risks of innovation failure.  
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We show that exploratory R&D can improve organisational performance by reducing the risk 
of abandonment of innovation activities. We use information related to two temporal 
dimensions of exploratory R&D: current tasks and accumulated experience (Argote & Miron-
Spektor, 2011). We find evidence of a beneficial interplay between past experience of 
explorative research and current exploratory R&D, although the effect is significant only for 
reducing failure in the conception phase of the innovation process. This suggests that 
information based on previous experience, when applied to current exploration, can help to 
identify problems and possible solutions mainly in the conception phase, when innovation 
activities are characterised by structured experimentation and are less dependent on context-
specific issues. We show also that the intensity of investment in current exploration 
contributes to reducing the risk of failure in both the conception and implementation phases of 
innovation projects. This suggests that although current exploration is likely to generate 
unstructured information, which could lead to attribution and inferential errors, a substantial 
amount of efforts devoted to current exploration can help the firm to interpret ill-defined 
problems and to respond to them in a timely way.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and presents our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methods. Section 4 presents our findings and 
some robustness checks. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications of our findings 
for management and future research. 
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 2. EXPLORATION AND INNOVATION FAILURE  
 2.1 Exploratory R&D: buffer to myopic learning and driver of innovation failure?  
Organisational learning processes can induce myopia due to over-attention to immediate 
performance and a tendency to ignore exploration and distant search (Levinthal & March, 
1993). Adaptive learning, in which firms prioritise effectiveness and attention to innovation in 
the familiar territory of current experience, limits the opportunities for learning (Gupta et al., 
2006; Fang et al., 2010). This is because firms tend to focus on reliable and predictable 
performance at the expense of the search for new ideas or new markets, which has less certain 
outcomes, longer time horizons and more diffuse effects (March, 1991; Arora et al., 2015). 
These adaptive learning processes potentially can be self-destructive and endanger the 
organisation’s long-term survival (March, 1991, 2006). 
In contrast, organisations may try deliberately to counterbalance the bias towards myopic 
learning by committing to exploration activities. Exploration includes activities related to 
search, variation, experimentation, flexibility and discovery (March, 1991). It contributes to 
building capabilities outside current competencies and niches (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Nerkar, 
2003; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001), helps to develop new cognitive frames (Chiva et al., 2010) 
and enables learning from failure (Edmondson, 2011; Madsen & Desai, 2010). Thus, 
exploration activities can be conceived as essential for long-term firm survival and growth.  
Exploration typically is embedded in the innovation strategies of firms committed to formal 
R&D investment. Firms’ investment in R&D nurtures expertise in fields that represent new 
opportunities and contributes to the building of in-house competencies to develop new 
products and processes (Tidd et al., 1997; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Dodgson et al., 2008). In 
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particular, exploration-oriented R&D is likely to contribute to a radical departure from the 
organisation’s current knowledge-base and avoid myopic learning.  
In fact, R&D is not a homogenous activity (e.g., Barge-Gil & Lopez, 2014; Czarnitzki et al., 
2011). We contend that the ‘R’, the research component, is the main channel for exploration 
within R&D activity, while the ‘D’, the development component, is associated mainly with 
exploitation activities. Research (R) can be disentangled further into basic and applied 
elements. Basic research is experimental or theoretical work aimed at the acquisition of new 
knowledge on foundations and observable facts, not aimed at any particular application 
(OECD, 2002). This activity, which is characterised by uncertainty and a long time horizon, is 
clearly exploratory in nature since it refers to the search for new ideas and relations among 
constructs (March, 1991). Applied research shares with basic research the search for original 
outcomes - i.e. new pieces of knowledge or new operational methods - while it differentiates 
from basic research for the specific objective of addressing practical aims (OECD, 2002). In 
contrast to research, the outcomes of the development component of R&D are more 
predictable, have a shorter time horizon and are based on existing ideas and relations (March, 
1991). Development makes use of existing knowledge that emerged from the research phase 
or from practical experience and is directed towards the introduction of new materials, 
products and devices or improvements to existing ones (OECD, 2002). In sum, to use 
March’s (1991) terminology, research can be considered as closely related to the “exploration 
of new possibilities”, while development is concerned mainly with the “exploitation of old 
certainties”.  
While the exploratory component of R&D is necessary to avoid myopic learning, it increases 
the chances of innovation failure due to the inherently complex nature of the activities 
involved in exploration and the uncertainty related to its potential outcomes. Project failure is 
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more frequent in companies engaged in exploration activities since this type of activity is 
more likely to face unpredictable contingencies. Indeed, the notion of innovation failure is 
typically associated with deviation from the expected and desired results from an R&D 
project and as involving “both avoidable errors and the unavoidable negative outcomes of 
experiments and risk taking” (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005: 300).  
We define innovation failure as the realisation of unacceptably low performance in R&D 
projects that results in a managerial decision to terminate the activity, which can occur at any 
stage of the innovation development process (Green et al., 2003; Shepherd & Cardon, 2009; 
Shepherd et al., 2014). We consider two major stages associated with the development of firm 
innovation projects: the conception phase and the implementation (or execution) phase (Tidd 
et al., 1997). In the conception phase, firms search for alternative innovation choices 
(identifying technological and market opportunities) and select ideas that are proposed and 
tested to establish an intended design or proof-of-concept prototype. The implementation 
phase corresponds to the stage in the innovation process when innovation efforts are oriented 
to executing the project to achieve a functional or working prototype that can be used to scale 
up manufacture and deliver a marketable product. Since exploratory R&D involves expanding 
the current set of capabilities, firms are likely to be exposed to a wide range of possible 
failures in both the conception and implementation phases of the innovation process. We 
consider project innovation failures associated with these two phases separately, since we 
expect this distinction to allow us to identify similarities and differences in the relationship 
between exploratory R&D and innovation failures.  
Based on this discussion, we hypothesize that: 
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H1: Exploratory R&D is positively associated to the probability of innovation failure in 
the conception and implementation phases of the innovation process. 
H1 is our baseline hypothesis and is in line with prior contributions, although, to our 
knowledge, no direct test of the effect of exploratory R&D on the probability of innovation 
failure has been proposed in the literature. In what follows, we test this hypothesis (H1) to 
challenge two fundamental aspects of its underlying proposition. First, we contend that the 
expectation of a positive association between exploratory R&D and innovation failure is not 
uniform; instead, this effect may depend on both the scale of current exploratory R&D and the 
interplay with accumulated experience of exploratory R&D. Second, we investigate whether 
the effects of exploratory R&D on innovation failure are different in the innovation process 
phases of conception and implementation.  
 2.2 Learning from R&D exploration activity 
The above discussion refers to the increased exposure to failure associated to exploratory 
R&D and raises questions about whether and to what extent firms can manage this conflict. 
Drawing on organisational research which maintains that learning begins with experience 
(Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011), we argue that experience in R&D 
exploration activity can provide learning opportunities that help organisations to attenuate the 
risk of innovation failure.     
Search processes are not unstructured activities (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Firms engaging in 
exploratory search activities establish programmed procedures and standard practices to 
increase the returns from experimentation and to increase the efficiency of the process by 
reducing the chances of errors and mistakes. Consequently, firms can improve the 
performance of their exploration-related activities based on accumulated experience. 
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However, although accumulated experience is important, the transfer of existing practices to 
specific contexts is not always either easy or feasible, particularly in contexts that involve the 
identification of actionable responses related to radically new lines of inquiry - which is what 
exploratory search is about (Cook & Brown, 1999; Majchrzak et al., 2004). This leads to an 
acknowledgement of the temporal dimension of the knowledge creation and learning 
processes associated to exploration activity (Nerkar, 2003), and the distinction between 
learning from accumulated experience and learning in practice (Cook & Brown, 1999). 
Building on this discussion, we suggest that exploration in R&D offers two sources of 
learning opportunities, which could contribute to balancing the conflict between more 
intensive exploratory search and increased rates of failure: experiential-based learning from 
past exploration and inferential-based learning from current exploration. We discuss these 
aspects below.  
2.2.1 Experiential-based learning from past exploration 
Firms’ accumulated experience of exploratory R&D can be embedded in routines and 
standard procedures, which contribute to the development of intelligence, monitoring and 
surveillance capabilities associated with experimentation activity. This accumulated 
experience and sustained exploratory R&D efforts can lead to learning opportunities to reduce 
the likelihood of failure in innovation activities. This is described as ‘experiential-based 
learning from past exploration’. 
First, we argue that programmed exploration can be particularly effective for reducing 
instances of preventable failure caused by deviance from rules, inattention or lack of ability in 
the conduct of routine and predictable operations (Edmondson, 2011). Along similar lines, 
Thomke (2001) suggests that building experimentation capabilities implies avoiding two 
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types of mistakes: those resulting from badly conducted experiments, which produce 
ambiguous or not valuable information, and those that involve repeating prior failures. The 
extant literature suggests that longitudinal information on past performance, different 
perspectives on what went wrong in the past, the sharing of ideas with managers able to 
implement change, and careful consideration of whether change is having the desired effect 
contribute to building the firm’s capacity to anticipate, analyse and act upon failure (Tucker & 
Edmondson, 2003; Cannon & Edmondson, 2005). 
In addition, we contend that past experience in exploration activity can be beneficial if it leads 
to opportunities for more effective future exploration activities. Organisations can benefit 
from the interaction between current and accumulated experience in exploration activity, 
through a moderating effect that reduces the probability of failure. Past exploration activities 
can help to map and navigate the relevant search space and, thereby, contribute to making 
current exploration activities more efficient and to developing a learning process associated to 
current exploration (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Majchrzak et al. 
(2004) report that past experience can support different stages of current radical and 
exploratory innovation: from the conceptualization of new ideas, through the use of analogies 
and extensions linked to previously developed concepts, to final product development, in 
which experience is shared in the course of testing, review and improvements on prototypes. 
Past experience can provide an appropriate lens to analyse new information collected en route 
and to improve the accuracy of inferences related to current exploration processes (Denrell et 
al., 2004). This can be achieved by applying information elicited from both successful and 
failed past exploratory activities, to current R&D exploration (Leonard-Barton, 1995; 
Edmondson, 2011).  
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Accordingly, we acknowledge knowledge retention as central to the firm’s learning process 
and as depending on the organisational memory embedded in employees, the tools available 
and the tasks to be performed (Argote & Ingram, 2000). In this framework, past experience 
provides meta-knowledge about who knows and does what (i.e. transactive memory), which, 
in turn, increases ongoing performance by improving: (i) task assignment (better matching of 
researchers to research tasks); (ii) problem solving and coordination (researchers know whom 
to approach for advice) and (iii) division of intellectual labour which leads to specialised 
learning of different pieces of information. In sum, past experience of exploratory R&D, if 
properly retained and reused in current endeavours (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011), can 
improve organisational performance and reduce the risk of failure. 
However, it is important to note that applying previously elaborated data and schemes to 
current, and possibly different, activities requires refinement of insights from prior 
experience. Although the relevant information may be available in the organisation through 
accumulated experience, it can be difficult to find solutions to complex problems in a changed 
use environment (Von Hippel & Tyre, 1995). In our context, this implies that past exploration 
experience becomes an organisational asset if applied appropriately to current exploration. 
Firms can make use of previously acquired information to improve identification of the causes 
of problems in their innovation activities and allow their correction before they can lead to 
failure. Such beneficial interplay between past and current exploration resonates with the 
prescriptions in Schilling et al. (2003: 50), according to which learning opportunities are 
maximised in the case of related variation, that is, when “working on different but similar 
types of problems over time”. This type of variation, which is likely to occur in subsequent 
exploratory activities within the same firm, allows a deeper understanding of the performed 
tasks by creating associations among similar concepts in different contexts. 
12 
 
This is the author’s post-print copy of the article published on 
Industrial and Corporate Change 
https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtx044  
 
These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:     
H2: Past experience in exploratory R&D negatively moderates the relation between 
current exploratory R&D and the probability of failure in the conception and implementation 
phases. 
 2.2.2 Inferential-based learning from current exploration 
We next discuss the learning potential from current exploration activities, which we describe 
as inferential learning in the context of practice (Cook & Brown, 1999). Efforts oriented 
towards exploration tend, by definition, to challenge the organisation’s existing knowledge 
base. Indeed, the context that characterises exploration activities involves features that, 
typically, defy current routines and existing capabilities. New exploration activities involve 
causal ambiguity and resolution of ill-defined problems, since firms have a partial 
understanding of the causal relationships among multiple stages in search processes 
associated with radical new product development (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Segal, 2004). 
Current R&D exploration is characterised also by delayed performance feedback and credit 
assignment, since there is a temporal lag between action and observed performance (Denrell 
et al., 2004; Fang, 2012). These activities often involve the formulation of new agendas to 
define novel product portfolio and business model orientations (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; He & 
Wong, 2004). In this context, well-established routines may not only provide limited guidance 
but also may hinder the development of new cognitive frames that provide adequate 
representations of the nature of the problem at hand.     
However, we contend that learning from current exploration can occur especially if the scale 
of the research expands the experimentation space and increases the number of observations 
to draw upon. Learning from current exploration might be even more important than learning 
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based on past experience, whose value might depreciate over time (Argote et al., 1990; Argote 
& Miron-Spektor, 2011; Benkard, 2000). In the course of their current exploratory R&D, 
firms can devise adaptive problem-solving reactions, even if the possibility for a radical 
revision of the prevailing rules of action and routines is limited in the short-run (Argyris & 
Schön, 1978; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Sadler-Smith et al., 2001). These learning outcomes can be 
guided by information elicited from projects that are ongoing. Partial information, in the form 
of unstructured pieces of knowledge in the problem space or intermediate clues and signals 
within a multistage problem, may be useful to guide exploration and avoid “random walks” 
(Denrell et al., 2004; Fang & Levinthal, 2009).   
In organizing their exploration activities, firms generally acknowledge that more radical 
experiments are likely to provide both learning opportunities and also greater exposure to 
failure in the short-term. Leonard-Barton (1995) and Edmondson (2011) point to instances of 
“good” or “intelligent” innovation failure that are associated with deliberate experimentation 
and exploration oriented to providing valuable opportunities for acquiring new knowledge in 
the short term, and contributing to the interpretation of ongoing problems. Intelligent failures 
are likely to be particularly important in the project conception phase when firms can explore 
different paths and reject unfeasible alternatives at comparatively low cost. This applies 
especially to new simulation technologies, which have continuously reduced the costs of 
generating critical data on virtual, as opposed to physical prototypes (Thomke, 2001). 
Moreover, current R&D exploration efforts can trigger new heuristics and interpretive skills at 
any point in the innovation process, contributing to the adoption of new frames of reference 
and problem-definition schemes to avoid preventable and complexity-related failures. New 
heuristics and interpretive skills increase inference accuracy and compensate for the small-
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scale experimentation and limited experiential-based sources of learning associated with new 
exploration (Kim et al., 2009).   
Therefore, as a consequence of inferential-based learning from exploration activities, we 
argue that the probability of innovation failure is likely to decline with an increased scale of 
current exploration efforts. Accordingly, we hypothesize a curvilinear inverted U-shaped 
relationship between current exploratory R&D and innovation failure. The rationale for this 
hypothesis is that, while current R&D exploration is likely to challenge existing routines and 
expose firms to higher risks of innovation failure (as put forward in Hypothesis 1), current 
R&D exploration efforts are likely to enhance the firm’s capacity to interpret unstructured 
information once a threshold scale of exploration is achieved, resulting in learning 
opportunities that contribute to reduce innovation failure in both the conception and 
implementation phases.       
Thus, we hypothesize that:   
H3: The degree of current exploratory R&D has an inverted U-shape relationship with 
the probability of experiencing innovation failure in the conception and implementation 
phases. 
 3. DATA AND METHODS 
 3.1 Data and sample frame 
Our analysis uses data from PITEC which is co-managed by the Spanish National Statistics 
Institute (INE), the Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology (FECYT) and the 
Foundation for Technical Innovation (COTEC). PITEC is a Community Innovation Survey 
15 
 
This is the author’s post-print copy of the article published on 
Industrial and Corporate Change 
https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtx044  
 
(CIS)-type, firm-level anonymised dataset based on survey waves (for a review of innovation 
surveys, see Mairesse & Mohnen, 2010).1 PITEC’s core sections are similar to sections in the 
CIS, a harmonised questionnaire developed by Eurostat based on the OECD’s Oslo Manual 
(OECD, 2005). Due to its reliability, open-access policy and range of innovation-related 
information, PITEC is being used increasingly as the data source for empirical studies of firm 
level innovation.2 PITEC data are particularly appropriate for our study because they allow 
identification of the exploratory character of R&D, and they provide information on 
innovation failures in the conception and implementation phases of the innovation process. 
We focus on the period 2007-2012, aggregating information from six PITEC annual survey 
waves. Similar to other CIS-type surveys, some of the questions (e.g., about failure in 
innovation projects) refer to a three-year period (e.g., for the 2012 survey wave, some 
questions refer to the period 2010-2012), while other questions (e.g., on R&D spending, 
among others) refer to a single year (2012). For consistency, we use three consecutive waves 
of the PITEC survey to build measures for our key variables (i.e., 2007, 2008 and 2009; and 
2010, 2011 and 2012). This allows us to build a set of variables referring to two non-
overlapping periods (2007-2009 and 2010-2012). The sample contains full information for the 
variables of interest for 2,226 manufacturing firms over two time periods (2007-2009 and 
2010-2012), resulting in a quasi-balanced panel of 4,191 firm-period observations.  
Our main focus is on firms that engage in innovation-related activities and therefore are 
susceptible to experience different rates of innovation-related failure. Table 1 shows the 
1 PITEC data for the different waves are available at : http://icono.fecyt.es/PITEC/Paginas/descarga_bbdd.aspx 
(last accessed April 2017). 
2 See for instance: Molero & Garcia, 2008; Vega-Jurado et al., 2009; Santamaria et al., 2012; Trigo & Vence, 
2012; Audretsch et al., 2014; Barge-Gil & Lopez, 2014; Busom et al., 2014; Afcha & Garcia-Quevedo, 2016; 
Marzucchi & Montresor, 2017. A list of PITEC-based publications is available at: 
https://icono.fecyt.es/PITEC/Documents/2016/Utilizaci%C3%B3n%20del%20PITEC%20(Nov.%202016).pdf 
(last accessed July 2017). 
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proportion of firms included in PITEC that have experienced overall failure and failure in the 
conception and implementation phases of innovation projects, distinguishing between those 
engaged in innovation-related activities and those that are not. 3  Table 1 shows that, as 
expected, the probability of failure is higher for companies that engage in innovation activities 
(the difference between the two probabilities is always statistically significant at the 1% 
confidence level). Given the focus of our analysis, we restrict the sample to manufacturing 
firms that are exposed to the risk of experiencing innovation failure, that is, companies that 
engage in innovation activities. 4 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT Table 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
3.2 Variables and measures 
3.2.1 Dependent variables  
Our dependent variables, Failure overall, Failure conception and Failure implementation, 
proxy for failure in innovation activities, reflected in the decision to terminate an innovation 
project, and the decision to terminate it in the stages of conception and implementation (Green 
et al., 2003; Shepherd & Cardon, 2009; Shepherd et al., 2014). Other studies based on CIS or 
PITEC data (e.g., Mohnen et al., 2008; Lhuillery & Pfister, 2009; D’Este et al., 2015; 
3 Engagement in innovation-related activities is defined as investing at least once over the period 2007-2012, in 
one of the following activities: intra-mural R&D; extramural R&D; acquisition of machinery, equipment and 
software; acquisition of other external knowledge; training; market introduction of innovations; other 
innovation-related activities. 
4 Note that the firms in our sample are likely to suffer innovation failures not necessarily related only to intra-
mural R&D, which should mitigate any sample selection problems in the construction of our sample. Appendix 
Table A1 shows the non-negligible proportion of companies that experience all three types of failure (overall, 
conception and implementation) and engage in different types of innovation-related activities: (i) only intramural 
R&D; (ii) only other innovation-related activities (i.e. non-intramural R&D); and (iii) both intramural R&D and 
other innovation-related activities. 
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Leoncini, 2016) adopt a similar approach to capture innovation failures using information on 
abandoned activities.  
Our dependent variables are built relying on firms’ responses corresponding to the relevant 
three-year periods: 2007-2009 and 2010-2012. Failure overall is a dummy that takes the 
value 1 if the firm faces a failure event in an innovation project, i.e. if the firm reported 
abandonment of an innovation project in the conception or implementation phases. Following 
the arguments in Section 2, we consider two phases in which failures can occur: firms were 
asked to “locate” the event of a failure in either the conception or the implementation phases 
of innovation activities. Failure conception is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm faces 
a failure event in the conception phase of an innovation project, that is, if a project was 
abandoned in the conception phase. Failure implementation is a dummy that takes the value 1 
if the firm faces a failure event in the implementation phase of an innovation project, that is, if 
the firm reported abandoning an innovation project in the implementation phase.  
3.2.2 Explanatory variables 
We draw on previous studies and distinguish between exploratory and exploitation activities 
in the R&D process to build our explanatory variables (Czarnitzki et al., 2009; Czarnitzki et 
al., 2011; Barge-Gil & Lopéz, 2014, 2015). In Section 2.1 we discussed the connection 
between the characterisation of exploration and exploitation proposed in March (1991), and 
the standard definitions of R&D (OECD, 2002). PITEC data allow us to quantify the firm’s 
engagement in the different components of R&D investment, in a way that is consistent with 
established measurement of innovation activity practices (OECD, 2002, 2005). In particular, 
PITEC data allow us to differentiate among investment in basic research, applied research and 
development. Basic research relates to “experimental or theoretical work undertaken to obtain 
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new knowledge on the foundation of phenomena or observable facts, without any particular 
application in view”. Also, applied research “consists of original work undertaken to obtain 
new knowledge” and differs from basic research in being “aimed at a particular objective”. 
Finally, development is defined as “systematic work based on existing knowledge, derived 
from research or practical experience, that is directed to the production of new materials, 
products or devices, or to installing new processes, systems and services or to improving 
those already existing or installed”.5    
Based on these definitions, we construct our main explanatory variables for engagement in 
exploratory R&D. R&D exploration is obtained by averaging real expenditure on basic and 
applied research in 2007-2009 and in 2010-20126 and dividing the figures obtained by the 
average number of employees in the corresponding periods. To reduce distribution skewness, 
we apply a natural logarithmic transformation (adding +1 to avoid dropping zeros). We use 
R&D exploration to test our base-line hypothesis (H1) on the positive relationship between 
current exploration activities and the firm’s exposure to innovation failure.  
Hypothesis 2 refers to the combined effect of past exploration experience and current 
exploratory R&D. We test this hypothesis by including the interaction R&D exploration X 
R&D exploration -1. R&D exploration -1 captures past exploratory R&D: in 2007-2009 for 
the probability of failure in the period 2010-2012, and in 2004-2006 for the probability of 
failure in the period 2007-2009. We obtained information on investment in explorative R&D 
activities during 2004-2006 from three previous waves of the PITEC survey, which maintains 
5 See https://icono.fecyt.es/PITEC/Documents/2014/cuestionario12.pdf (translated from Spanish, last accessed 
April 2017). 
6 Real exploration expenditure is nominal exploration expenditure deflated by the consumer price index for the 
corresponding period. 
19 
 
                                              
This is the author’s post-print copy of the article published on 
Industrial and Corporate Change 
https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtx044  
 
the panel nature of our dataset. 7  Finally, Hypothesis 3 predicts an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between explorative R&D and the probability of experiencing innovation failure. 
To capture this non-linear effect we include in our econometric specification the squared term 
R&D exploration sq.  
3.2.3 Control variables 
We tried to minimise omitted variables bias by including a set of controls in the econometric 
specification. We include a variable for the amount of investment in exploitation activities, 
R&D exploitation, measured as the natural log transformed ratio of average expenditure on 
development activities normalised by the average number of employees in the same period. 
We control for factors that might affect the likelihood of failure during innovation activities. 
Following the literature, we consider both financial and non-financial barriers (e.g., Blanchard 
et al., 2013; D’Este et al., 2012, 2014). The PITEC data do not provide continuous 
information on the relevance of barriers: hampering factors are recorded on likert scales that 
reflect the relevance of these issues for the firm. To define our barriers-related variables, we 
follow D’Este et al. (2012, 2014) and Antonioli et al. (2016) and create three dummies that 
take value 1 if the firm faced at least one highly relevant obstacle related to cost, knowledge 
or market. Specifically, Cost barriers captures whether the firm faced at least one major 
obstacle in the form of innovation costs, and internal or external funding for innovation. 
Knowledge barriers reflects whether the firm reported knowledge barriers as highly 
important, including items such as problems related to the availability of skilled personnel, 
information on technology, information on markets and availability of appropriate innovation 
partners. We consider also the potential effect of markets perceived as being dominated by 
7 Due to missing information for some relevant independent variables, such as organisational innovation, we 
could not include this time period, 2004-2006, in the estimation of our baseline model. 
20 
 
                                              
This is the author’s post-print copy of the article published on 
Industrial and Corporate Change 
https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtx044  
 
incumbents (Market barriers - dominated) and characterised by uncertain demand (Market 
barriers - uncertainty). 
We control for different forms of engagement in innovation not included in our exploration 
and exploitation measures, that might be particularly relevant to small and medium sized 
enterprises and non-R&D intensive industries (e.g., Rammer et al., 2009; Sterlacchini, 1999). 
Other innovation expenditures, defined over the reference period as the natural log 
transformed average sum (adding +1 to avoid dropped zeros), include expenditure per 
employee on external R&D, machinery, equipment and software, external knowledge, 
training, introduction of innovation in the market, design and other activities. To further 
capture the complexity of the firm’s innovation profile, we control for adoption of open 
innovation strategies (e.g., Chesbrough, 2003). Building upon Laursen & Salter (2006), we 
use two variables proxying for external knowledge search breadth (Knowledge breadth) and 
depth (Knowledge depth) in the firm’s innovation strategy. Knowledge breadth takes values 
from 0 to 10, based on the number of sources of information for innovation used by the firm 
in the period considered. Knowledge depth ranges from 0 to 10, based on the number of 
information sources the firm rated as highly important in the period under consideration.8 
In order to control for cutting-edge and risky innovation activities, we include a dummy, 
Radical innovation. In the absence of information on the number of innovations introduced, 
this variable takes the value 1 if the firm introduced at least one innovation that was new to 
the market (e.g., Monjon & Waelbroeck, 2003; Duguet, 2006). Also, we control for whether 
the company undertook any relevant organisational innovation in the period considered. We 
exploit information from responses to PITEC survey questions on organisational innovation 
8 PITEC data include information on the following sources of information for innovation: suppliers; customers; 
competitors; consultants and private R&D institutes; universities; public research institutes; technological 
transfer offices; conferences, trade fairs, exhibitions; scientific journals and trade/technical publications; 
professional and industry associations. 
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to create the dummy Organisational innovation, which takes the value 1 if the firm 
introduced new or improved management systems, changes to the firm’s work organisation 
(with reference to decision-making and distribution of responsibilities) or changes to relations 
with other organisations, and zero otherwise. 9  We also include firm age (natural log 
transformed) (Firm age), which may be related to the propensity to introduce disruptive and 
risky innovations, and the likelihood of higher obstacles to innovation (e.g., Schneider & 
Veugelers, 2010). We consider a set of characteristics that might influence innovation 
resources, incentives and, in turn, the likelihood of engagement in unsuccessful innovation 
activities: number of employees dedicated to R&D activities (Number of R&D researchers), 
group affiliation (Group) and firm size (Number of employees). Number of R&D researchers 
is the (log transformed+1) number of FTE researchers in the firm’s R&D department and 
takes account of a possible R&D size effect. Group affiliation is measured as a dummy 
variable, while firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the average number of 
employees in the reference period (+1). Finally, we include four dummies for the effect of 
industry characteristics, based on Pavitt’s (1984) industry sectors: science-based, specialised 
supplier, scale-intensive and supplier-dominated.10 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study; Table 3 reports the 
correlation matrix of these variables. Apart from variables that are transformations of other 
variables (e.g. R&D exploration sq), correlation among the independent variables is generally 
9 Organisational innovation takes the value 1 if the firm replied “yes” to any of the following questions: (i) “Has 
the firm introduced new business practices in the organization of work or company procedures?”; (ii) “Has the 
firm introduced new methods for the organization of workplaces with the aim of distribution of responsibilities 
and decision-making?” and (iii) “Has the firm introduced new methods of managing external relations with other 
companies or public institutions?” 
10 Each firm was assigned to a unique Pavitt category according to its 2-digit industry class (NACE rev.2 
classification) following the Revised Pavitt taxonomy in Bogliacino & Pianta (2016). We estimated our 
empirical models using the set of 2-digit industry dummies. Although the results hold, the test of joint 
significance of industry dummies is always far from significant. For this reason, we prefer to rely on broader (but 
generally jointly significant) industry controls based on Pavitt categories. 
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weak and mean variance inflation factors range between 1.36 and 3.73 (well below the 
threshold value of 5), suggesting the absence of multi-collinearity problems. 11 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT Table 2 AND Table 3 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3.2.3 Methods 
To estimate the factors that influence three different types of innovation failure events, we 
employ probit models based on panel data: 
𝑃(𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 1│𝒙𝑖𝑡, 𝒛𝑖𝑡,𝜇𝑖  ) = 𝛷(𝒙𝑖𝑡′ 𝜷+ 𝒛𝑖𝑡′ 𝜸 + 𝜇𝑖  ) 
𝑃(𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 1│𝒙𝑖𝑡, 𝒛𝑖𝑡,𝜇𝑖  ) = 𝛷(𝒙𝑖𝑡′ 𝜷 + 𝒛𝑖𝑡′ 𝜸 + 𝜇𝑖  ) 
𝑃(𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 1│𝒙𝑖𝑡, 𝒛𝑖𝑡,𝜇𝑖  ) = 𝛷(𝒙𝑖𝑡′ 𝜷+ 𝒛𝑖𝑡′ 𝜸 + 𝜇𝑖  ) 
where 𝛷(. )  is the cumulative normal distribution function; 𝒙𝑖𝑡′  is the vector of our key 
explanatory variables for firm i at time t; 𝒛𝑖𝑡 ′ is the vector of controls for firm i at time t; and 
µi is the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity term. 
The models are estimated by employing a random effects specification. We prefer random 
effects to fixed effects because a large proportion of the firms in our sample are characterised 
11 As the correlation table shows (Table 3), the correlations between our focal variables (R&D exploration, R&D 
exploration -1 and R&D exploration sq) are high and, in some cases, above an acceptable threshold (0.7). We rsn 
some additional diagnostic tests to check for multicollinearity problems. Notably, the condition index for the 
three model specifications adopted in the empirical part of the paper ranges between 28 and 31: all values are 
close to the threshold of 30 (Hair et al., 1998: 220). Also, the Theil R2 multicollinearity effect for the three 
models ranges between 0.01 and 0.08, which is well below the value indicating multicollinearity, i.e. 1 (Theil, 
1971). As further corroboration, we followed Cronbach (1987) and subtracted the mean from our core 
explanatory variables and then re-ran our main estimates. The results confirmed the estimates obtained using the 
untransformed variables and reported in the results section. 
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by no within-variation in the relevant dependent variables,12 which would have significantly 
reduced the number of companies available for a fixed effects estimation. We preferred a 
larger and more representative sample and, thus, implement only random effects.13 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Main Results 
Table 4 presents our baseline results, examining the relation between current engagement in 
exploratory R&D and the probability of innovation failure - overall and in the conception and 
implementation phases. The coefficient of R&D exploration is always positive and highly 
significant, which provides evidence of the risky nature of exploration. Increasing the 
exploration orientation of R&D activities increases the overall risk of failure in innovation 
activities. Most significantly for our hypotheses, an increase in exploratory R&D activities 
increases the probability of failing in the conception and in the implementation phases of the 
innovation project life cycle as shown by the results in Table 4, columns 2 and 3. This 
supports Hypothesis 1. The relation is relevant from an economic perspective: an increase of 
1% in exploratory R&D increases the odds of failure in the conception (implementation) 
phase by around 12% (6%).14 
12 E.g., 55% of companies that experienced failure in the conception phase in period t, faced same types of 
failure in period t+1. 
13  We also performed Hausman and Mundlak tests (Wooldridge, 2010) to check whether a fixed effects 
specification was preferred to a random effects specification. Both tests in all model specifications (Table 4, 
Table 5 and Table 6) cannot be rejected at the standard confidence levels, confirming our choice of random 
effects.  
14 Interpreting the coefficients in the non-linear models is difficult, especially in relation to the squared and 
interaction effects. Recent studies using cross-sectional data suggest graphing the marginal effects to obtain a 
better understanding of the point in the distribution when they become significant (Ai & Norton, 2003; Greene, 
2010; Zelner, 2009). In our case, the longitudinal nature of our empirical models adds complexity. Specifically, 
the presence of an unobserved heterogeneity term does not allow application of these graphing approaches 
without strong assumptions concerning the behaviour of the heterogeneity term. To overcome this problem, we 
adopt the option suggested by Buis (2010) and interpret the coefficients as odds ratios. The main advantage of 
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 INSERT Table 4 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Hypothesis 2 refers to the interaction between past exploration and current engagement in 
exploratory R&D. Table 5 shows that the value of previous R&D exploration activities is 
never significant per se (columns 1, 3 and 5). Also, the results reported in Table 5 column 2 
point to the absence of a moderating effect (R&D exploration X R&D exploration -1 negative 
but not statistically significant) in the case of the overall probability of failure. Interestingly, if 
we split the probability of failure into its constituent parts (see Table 5 columns 3 and 4 for 
conception and columns 5 and 6 for implementation), we find that in the case of conception 
failure there is a direct effect, captured by the coefficient of R&D exploration -1, which is 
positive and significant, and a moderating effect, captured by the interaction R&D exploration 
X R&D exploration -1, which is negative and significant (see Table 5 column 4). The effect of 
the interaction between past experience and current exploration is small, but non-negligible: 
the effect of current exploration on innovation failure at the conception phase is decreased by 
1.1% for a 1% increase in investment in past exploration. In contrast, we find no evidence of a 
negative interplay between past experience and current experimentation in the case of 
implementation failure, which reduces support for Hypothesis 2. We reflect on these different 
results in the discussion section.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT Table 5 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
interpreting interaction and curvilinear effects as odds-ratios is that this interpretation (unlike use of marginal 
effects) does not depend on the value of the independent variable being considered. 
25 
 
                                                                                                                                               
This is the author’s post-print copy of the article published on 
Industrial and Corporate Change 
https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtx044  
 
 
The results related to Hypothesis 3 are reported in Table 6. The sign and significance of the 
coefficients of R&D exploration (positive and significant) and R&D exploration sq (negative 
and significant) suggest the presence of an inverted U-shaped relationship, which supports 
Hypothesis 3. 15  Notably, the positive relationship between exploration and failure at 
conception (implementation) is decreased by 3.29% (2.09%) for every additional 1% increase 
in current exploration. We can conclude that the intensity of engagement in exploratory R&D 
activity attenuates the initial positive relation between current exploratory R&D and failure. 
This beneficial effect occurs in the same three-year period. Hence, our results seem to confirm 
that firms can learn how to reduce failures from the performance of current and novel tasks if 
they have accumulated sufficient information from ongoing activities. Overall, our evidence 
points to the presence of a learning effect from exploratory R&D along the entire innovation 
project life cycle. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT Table 6 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 4.2 Robustness checks 
We check the robustness of our results to three problems. First, we consider an alternative 
measure for past experience in exploration activities: R&D exploration stock -1, which 
15 When comparing the unconstrained with the constrained specification for the three different specifications, we 
found the difference between the log-likelihoods of the constrained and unconstrained models were always 
statistically significant (respectively Χ2[1]=7.22, p-value=0.0072; Χ2[1]=11.04, p-value=0.0009 and Χ2[1]=4.72, 
p-value=0.0298).Thus, we conclude that the less restrictive model (the one with the squared term included) fits 
the data significantly better than the more restrictive model (our baseline model with only the linear term). 
Furthermore, the presence of an inverted U-shaped effect is confirmed by the test suggested in Lind & Mehlum 
(2010): we reject the null hypothesis of a monotonic or U-shaped relationship at the 5% significance level, in all 
the three specifications. 
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reflects the cumulated stock of expenditure on exploratory R&D in the previous period, which 
accounts also for obsolescent information on past engagement in exploratory R&D. Appendix 
Table A2 shows that the results are confirmed if we use an alternative measure of past 
experience, cumulated stock of exploration in R&D (R&D exploration stock -1 and R&D 
exploration X R&D exploration stock -1). 16 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table A2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Second, there might be problems related to the firm-level nature of our data. To investigate 
the determinants of innovation failure, the ideal analytical level is the project, with 
information on project resources (e.g., different types of R&D), obstacles, and termination or 
success. Although we do not have project-level information, we can check the robustness of 
our results to this problem by estimating our models for the sub-sample of small companies 
(less than 50 employees based on the European Commission definition).17 The rationale is 
that smaller sized companies, due to time and resource constraints and the absence of a formal 
R&D department, are more likely to have fewer (ideally no more than 1) innovation projects 
16 The stock variable is computed using the perpetual inventory method based on the following formulas: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡−1(1 − 𝛿) + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑡  and 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡0 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑡0/(𝑔 + 𝛿) . A 15% 
depreciation rate is assumed. As a robustness check, a range of depreciation rates (from 15% to 75% in intervals 
of 20 points) was used drawing on insights from the relevant literature on R&D stocks (Hall, 1993) and 
organisational learning (Argote et al., 1990; Baum & Ingram, 1998). The results are robust to the different 
specifications adopted. As for the pre-sample growth rate g, we assume it to be equal to the average growth rate 
of exploration at the 2-digit industry level (NACE rev.2 classification) in the period 2004-2008. We further 
tested the robustness of H2 by controlling for persistence in organisational commitment to exploratory R&D by 
including a third variable, which takes the value 1 if the firm invested in exploration in all three years in the 
reference period and 0 otherwise. The results are robust to this further specification and are available from the 
authors upon request. 
17 European Commission, “Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises (Text with EEA relevance) (notified under document number C(2003) 
1422)”, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32003H0361 (accessed April 
2017).  
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per period. The results reported in Appendix Table A3, Table A4 and Table A5 mostly 
support our main results. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table A3, Table A4 AND Table A5 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
We also consider the interdependence between conception and implementation phase failures 
in a bivariate setting, since the likelihood of these types of failure were found to be correlated 
(Pearson and tetrachoric correlation coefficients are 0.46 and 0.7 respectively). In the absence 
of well-established models to control for correlation among the error terms in a non-linear 
panel setting, we run a set of “pooled” bivariate probit models and control for clustering of the 
error terms for each firm. To further corroborate our results, we build upon Roodman’s (2011) 
recent work on fully observed recursive mixed-process models and estimate a probit 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE). Appendix Table A6 and Table A7 provide 
evidence of the robustness of our main results in both bivariate and probit SURE 
specifications. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table A6 AND Table A7 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigated the dual effects of exploration in R&D: while exploration increases 
firms’ exposure to disruption and abandonment of innovation activities, it provides potential 
learning opportunities to mitigate the risk of innovation failure. Investigation and disclosure 
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of the learning returns from exploration, and understanding the underlying working 
principles, are the core contributions of this study.  
Our empirical analysis confirms that exploratory R&D increases the firm’s exposure to 
innovation failure in both the conception and implementation phases of the innovation 
process. This supports the argument that engagement in exploratory research is associated 
with higher exposure to innovation failure. However, our findings also qualify this assertion 
in three critical aspects. First, we highlight the presence of learning opportunities from 
exploratory research with regard to the capacity of firms to mitigate innovation failure. 
Second, we uncover two mechanisms through which learning from exploration operates: (i) 
the interplay between past exploration experience and current exploration practice; and (ii) the 
enhanced inferential capacity from current exploration efforts. Third, we show that learning 
opportunities differ in distinct phases of the innovation process (i.e., the conception and 
implementation phases). These contributions have implications for both theory and practice, 
which we discuss below. 
This work contributes to organisational learning theory by examining learning processes from 
firms’ exploratory research. Our results provide support for the presence of a learning process 
from exploration, which triggers a positive change in organisational performance by reducing 
innovation failure. The main conceptual contributions of the study can be summarised as 
follows. First, this study identifies two potential sources of learning from exploration: (i) 
experiential-based learning from past exploratory research; and (ii) inferential-based learning 
from current exploratory research. The former is based on the learning opportunities derived 
from accumulated experience in exploration and is associated with the formation of routines 
and standard procedures that enhance functional performance associated with 
experimentation. The latter is based on learning opportunities derived from ongoing 
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exploration efforts and is associated with improved interpretation of ill-defined problems and 
enhanced inference in the presence of causal ambiguity. The study provides empirical support 
for the claim that these sources of learning can contribute to mitigate innovation failure, and 
provides a new lens to understand how exploratory R&D can contribute positively to firms’ 
innovation performance.  
Second, our analysis highlights the intricacies associated with the capacity to realise the 
learning opportunities from exploration, especially in relation to the role of the temporal 
dimensions of learning from exploratory research activities (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011). 
On the one hand, we find that accumulated experience from past exploration activities 
contributes to reducing the probability of innovation failure. However, our results run 
contrary to the standard learning-curve which predicts that performance outcomes are an 
automatic by-product of accumulated experience (Zangwill & Kantor, 1998). We find that 
past experience, per se, does not reduce the risk of abandonment of innovation projects. Our 
results show that accumulated experience in exploration activities has a beneficial effect on 
the link between current exploration efforts and innovation failure: it reduces the firm’s 
exposure to innovation failure through the interplay with current R&D exploration activity. 
We suggest that past experience in exploration provides critical learning for current activities 
by helping to navigate the relevant search space for exploration and building surveillance 
systems to identify deviations from established standards. In addition, when applied to current 
exploration, previously elaborated information can be refined and increase understanding 
about the causes of problems and their possible solutions. This result resonates with the 
“generative dance” proposed by Cook & Brown (1999) between knowledge embedded in 
organisational routines and knowledge gained in the context of practice, as a source of 
organisational learning and innovation.  
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It should be noted also that the moderating role of past exploration experience is significant 
only for reducing failure in the conception phase of the innovation process, not in the 
implementation phase. This is likely a consequence of the distinct challenges posed by 
exploration activities in the two phases of the innovation process. The conception phase is 
generally characterised by well-structured experimentation and standards, which exploit the 
analytical skills and capacity to interpret causal attribution and avoid inferential errors, of 
R&D unit researchers. The complementarities between past and current exploration 
experience seem to be less effective at reducing innovation failure in the implementation 
stages of the innovation process. Here, context specificities associated with the scaling up of 
the manufacturing processes and the generation of new working prototypes seem to benefit 
less from the interaction between accumulated experience and current exploration efforts. 
On the other hand, we find evidence of a curvilinear relationship between current exploration 
and innovation failure. In particular, we found support for an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between current investment in exploration activity and the probability of innovation failure in 
the conception and implementation phases of the innovation process. We found that, initially, 
exploration increases the chances of experiencing failure in the conception and 
implementation phases of the innovation process since generally it involves committing 
resources to search activities beyond current competencies and expertise. However, we also 
observed learning returns from exploratory R&D, measured by a reduced probability of 
failure with increasing levels of investment in current exploration activities. We argue that 
this source of learning from ongoing exploration efforts is associated with the firm’s 
improved capacity to interpret ill-defined problems, based on a better understanding of the 
causal relation mechanisms underlying the phenomenon being explored. This non-linear, 
inverted-U shaped relationship between current exploration efforts and the probability of 
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failure, reflects the complexity of the processes involved in exploration activities. These 
include difficulties related to interpreting unstructured information, attribution errors due to 
the absence of a precise understanding of the underlying causal relationships, and inferential 
errors based on a restricted sample of experimental results. By identifying these beneficial 
learning effects, we have highlighted an additional economic payoff from the exploratory 
component of R&D (David et al., 1992): fewer wasted resources resulting from the lower 
propensity to abandon innovation projects. 
Our findings provide valuable insights for innovation management. Although firms tend to 
prefer development-based exploitation to research-based exploration (Arora et al., 2015), we 
find that exploration offers two sources of learning that have the potential to reduce the risk of 
a failed innovation project. These sources emerge after a certain level of exploration effort 
and when current efforts are combined with accumulated experience in exploration activities. 
Hence, planning periods of peak engagement in exploratory activities, which previous 
research shows have a positive effect on firm performance (Mudambi & Swift, 2011, 2014), 
might be beneficial for reducing exposure to innovation failure. However, 
“compartmentalised” periods of sustained exploration could hamper the interaction between 
ongoing and past exploration. Our results point to the need for persistent commitment to 
exploration over time, avoiding major discontinuities in order to capitalise on retention, 
integration and reuse of previously acquired knowledge in ongoing efforts. The extent to 
which firms are able to connect ongoing exploration and past experience is essential to 
conceptualise problems and to scan, evaluate and implement reusable ideas - especially in the 
presence of time and resource constraints (Cook & Brown, 1999; Majchrzak et al., 2004). 
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Moreover, our results provide finer grained results on the interplay between accumulated 
experience in exploratory R&D and current exploration, showing that this interaction is more 
beneficial in the conception than in the implementation phases. The capacity to learn from 
exploration and act upon unsuccessful innovation activities is greater in the conception phase, 
given that both transactive memory (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011) and related variation 
(Schilling et al., 2003) enable larger learning opportunities in settings that provide better 
conditions for controlled experimentation and structured planning, and greater flexibility in 
terms of experimentation alternatives due to the lower opportunity costs of failure. Hence, it is 
in the early stage of a project life cycle that firms can maximise the reliance on previously 
developed standards and information. This beneficial connection between experience and 
current practice is reduced in the implementation phase when context specificities are more 
pronounced. Additionally, sources of organisational rigidity such as entrapment situations 
(Balachandra et al., 1996; Jani, 2011) or escalation of commitments (Jani, 2011; Schmidt & 
Calantone, 1998; Staw & Ross, 1987), which are particularly likely to emerge in the 
implementation phase, could further weaken the connection between prior experience and 
current exploration activities.  
The paper has some limitations that suggest avenues for future research. First, our definition 
of innovation failure forces us to measure it as a binary variable (whether the focal firm 
abandoned an innovation project or not in the period of reference). Providing a measure of the 
intensity of innovation failure at the firm level would enrich the analysis by showing the 
relative importance of innovation failure to firms experiencing different levels of research 
exploration efforts. Second, we rely on data from one country only, i.e. Spain. Future work 
should extend our analysis to a range of countries in order to allow the results obtained to be 
generalised. Third, although our longitudinal analysis tries to minimise problems of omitted 
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variables bias and unobserved heterogeneity, the absence of a pure experimental setting (or 
instrumental variables approach) suggests caution in interpreting the results in a causal way. 
Finally, future work could investigate the exploration-failure relation using project-level data, 
which would allow greater scrutiny of the mechanisms related to knowledge retention, 
codification and integration that might be at the basis of the beneficial interplay between past 
experience and current exploration.   
Despite these limitations, we believe that the insights from our study could serve as a guide 
and foundation for future work investigating the important role of firms’ exploration 
strategies for reducing innovation failure and achieving sustained competitive advantage. 
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Table 1: Probability of failure in R&D projects: engagement vs non engagement in 
innovation activities 
  Engaging in innovation-related activities 
Not engaging in 
innovation-related 
activities 
Pearson χ2 
% Failure overall 31.91% 9.38% 563.23[1]*** 
% Failure conception 24.4% 5.71% 482.62[1]*** 
% Failure implementation 20.84% 6.03% 336.77[1]*** 
Observations 3136 5628  
Degrees of freedom are in brackets. The sample refers to all manufacturing companies in for the period 2007-
2012. Firms engaging in innovation-related activities refer to companies which, in the period 2007-2012, 
invested in at least one of the following activities: intra-mural R&D; extramural R&D; acquisition of machinery, 
equipment and software; acquisition of other external knowledge; training; market introduction of innovations; 
other activities.  
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (N=4191) 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent variables     
  Fail overall 0.312 0.463 0 1 
  Fail conception 0.237 0.425 0 1 
  Fail implementation 0.202 0.401 0 1 
Explanatory variables     
  R&D Exploration 1702.389 4196.190 0 76390.03 
  R&D Exploration -1 1848.7 4513.98 0 76390.03 
Controls     
  R&D exploitation 2490.204 6060.781 0 114585 
  Num of R&D researchers 0.723 0.862 0 6.06 
  Other innovation expenditures 5.934 2.509 0 12.34 
  Cost barriers 0.167 0.373 0 1 
  Knowledge barriers 0.012 0.109 0 1 
  Market barriers uncertainty 0.266 0.442 0 1 
  Market barriers dominated 0.191 0.393 0 1 
  Knowledge breadth 6.406 3.302 0 10 
  Knowledge depth 1.279 1.579 0 10 
  Radical innovation 0.414 0.493 0 1 
  Organisational innovation 0.547 0.498 0 1 
  Firm age 3.284 0.572 1.61 5.18 
  Group 0.450 0.498 0 1 
  Number of employees 4.290 1.307 0.69 9.19 
Industry dummies  
(Pavitt Taxonomy) 
    
  Supplier dominated 0.343 0.475 0 1 
  Scale intensive 0.271 0.445 0 1 
  Specialised suppliers 0.211 0.408 0 1 
  Science based 0.175 0.380 0 1 
Descriptive statistics for R&D exploration, R&D Exploration -1 and R&D exploitation refer to the variables 
before natural log-transformation and are measured in euros per employee. Descriptive statistics for the 
following variables are reported with natural log transformation: Number of R&D researchers, Other innovation 
expenditures, Firm age and Number of employees. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix (N=4191) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] 
[1] Failure 1                    
[2] Failure Conception 0.82* 1                   
[3] Failure Implementation 0.74* 0.46* 1                  
[4] R&D exploration 0.12* 0.14* 0.1* 1                 
[5] R&D exploration -1 0.09* 0.10* 0.08* 0.61* 1                
[6] Explor X Explor -1 0.1* 0.12* 0.09* 0.83* 0.81* 1               
[7] R&D exploration Sq 0.11* 0.13* 0.09* 0.96* 0.62* 0.87* 1              
[8] R&D exploitation 0.07* 0.1* 0.03* 0.11* 0.08* 0.08* 0.11* 1             
[9] Knowledge breadth 0.12* 0.18* 0.09* 0.22* 0.15* 0.20* 0.22* 0.23* 1            
[10] Knowledge depth 0.07* 0.11* 0.06* 0.14* 0.1* 0.14* 0.15* 0.15* 0.41* 1           
[11] Other innovation exp 0.04* 0.05* 0.03* 0.06* 0.05* 0.09* 0.11* 0.08* 0.17* 0.14* 1          
[12] Firm age 0.05* 0.04* 0.04* -0.05* -0.06* -0.06* -0.08* -0.05* 0.04* 0.01 -0.05* 1         
[13] Group 0.04* 0.04* 0.05* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.08* 0.03* 0.05* 0.11* 1        
[14] Cost barriers -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.06* 0.01 -0.06* -0.13* 1       
[15] Knowledge barriers 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06* 0.12* 1      
[16] Mkt barriers uncertainty 0.07* 0.06* 0.07* 0.03* 0.01 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.04* 0.08* 0.03* -0.01 -0.06* 0.15* 0.09* 1     
[17] Mkt barriers dominated 0.06* 0.06* 0.04* 0.06* 0.02 0.06* 0.07* 0.04* 0.05* 0.11* 0.03* -0.03* -0.08* 0.13* 0.12* 0.37* 1    
[18] Number of Employees 0.06* 0.07* 0.06* -0.03* -0.08* -0.05* -0.07* -0.04* 0.14* 0.06* 0.01 0.35* 0.55* -0.15* -0.06* -0.11* -0.1* 1   
[19] Radical Innovation 0.1* 0.14* 0.07* 0.15* 0.11* 0.14* 0.15* 0.21* 0.17* 0.12* 0.15* 0.01 0.04* -0.03* -0.01 0.03* -0.01 0.05* 1  
[20] Organisational Innovation 0.13* 0.17* 0.09* 0.09* 0.07* 0.1* 0.08* 0.09* 0.23* 0.12* 0.14* 0.05* 0.10* -0.04* -0.01 0.04* 0.03* 0.16* 0.14* 1 
[21] Number R&D employees 0.13* 0.14* 0.12* 0.34* 0.27* 0.39* 0.40* 0.37* 0.29* 0.21* 0.19* 0.07* 0.28* -0.04* -0.03* -0.01 0.03* 0.4* 0.21* 0.16* 
Dummies for Pavitt (1984) four categories of industrial firms are not included for space reasons but correlation coefficient is never above 0.3. * p<0.05 
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Table 4 Innovation failures determinants: current exploration activities 
 Failure overall Failure conception Failure implementation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
R&D exploration 0.044*** 0.063*** 0.033*** 
 [0.010] [0.012] [0.011] 
R&D exploitation 0.026** 0.039*** 0.005 
 [0.011] [0.014] [0.012] 
Knowledge breadth 0.013 0.062*** 0.008 
 [0.012] [0.014] [0.012] 
Knowledge depth 0.019 0.037 0.016 
 [0.023] [0.026] [0.024] 
Other innovation expenditures 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 [0.014] [0.016] [0.015] 
Firm age 0.154** 0.115 0.127* 
 [0.068] [0.077] [0.074] 
Group 0.042 0.023 0.137 
 [0.086] [0.098] [0.091] 
Cost barriers -0.081 -0.128 -0.105 
 [0.093] [0.108] [0.099] 
Knowledge barriers 0.233 0.332 0.315 
 [0.308] [0.346] [0.316] 
Market barriers - uncertainty 0.226*** 0.146 0.256*** 
 [0.081] [0.093] [0.084] 
Market barriers - dominated 0.099 0.176* 0.026 
 [0.091] [0.104] [0.096] 
Number of employees 0.049 0.066 0.023 
 [0.040] [0.046] [0.043] 
Radical innovation 0.135** 0.269*** 0.105 
 [0.068] [0.076] [0.072] 
Org innovation 0.311*** 0.516*** 0.212*** 
 [0.068] [0.079] [0.073] 
Number of R&D researchers 0.056 -0.003 0.107* 
 [0.058] [0.063] [0.060] 
Wald Χ2 126.855[18]*** 172.878[18]*** 90.606[18]*** 
Firm-period observations 2226 2226 2226 
Firm observations 4191 4191 4191 
Random effects probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. The degrees 
of freedom of Wald χ2 test for the overall significance of variables are reported in parentheses. Dummies for 
Pavitt (1984) four categories of industrial firms are included (but not shown) in all regressions. Year dummies 
are not included as the joint test of significance is never rejected at the standard confidence levels. Dependent 
variable is the probability to fail in any phase in column 1, the probability to fail at the conception phase in 
column 2 and the probability to fail at the implementation phase in column 3. Base sample in all columns is an 
unbalanced panel, 2009-2012, with data at 3-year intervals in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the 
dependent variable (i.e., if t=2007-2009, so t-1=2004-2006). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 5 Innovation failures determinants: interaction effects 
 Failure overall Failure conception Failure implementation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
R&D exploration 0.039*** 0.049*** 0.059*** 0.086*** 0.028** 0.030* 
 [0.011] [0.017] [0.013] [0.019] [0.012] [0.018] 
R&D exploration -1 0.013 0.023 0.009 0.037** 0.014 0.016 
 [0.011] [0.016] [0.013] [0.019] [0.012] [0.018] 
R&D exploration X R&D exploration -1  -0.002  -0.006**  -0.001 
  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
R&D exploitation 0.027** 0.026** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.006 0.006 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.012] 
Knowledge breadth 0.013 0.013 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.007 0.007 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] 
Knowledge depth 0.019 0.019 0.037 0.038 0.017 0.017 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.026] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] 
Other innovation expenditures 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] 
Firm age 0.154** 0.154** 0.115 0.117 0.126* 0.126* 
 [0.068] [0.068] [0.077] [0.077] [0.074] [0.074] 
Group 0.041 0.041 0.022 0.024 0.136 0.136 
 [0.086] [0.086] [0.098] [0.098] [0.091] [0.091] 
Cost barriers -0.083 -0.084 -0.129 -0.131 -0.107 -0.107 
 [0.093] [0.093] [0.108] [0.108] [0.099] [0.099] 
Knowledge barriers 0.231 0.235 0.328 0.339 0.314 0.315 
 [0.308] [0.308] [0.345] [0.346] [0.315] [0.315] 
Market barriers - uncertainty 0.227*** 0.227*** 0.147 0.147 0.258*** 0.258*** 
 [0.081] [0.081] [0.093] [0.093] [0.084] [0.084] 
Market barriers - dominated 0.102 0.104 0.178* 0.182* 0.029 0.030 
 [0.091] [0.091] [0.104] [0.104] [0.097] [0.096] 
Number of employees 0.055 0.053 0.070 0.063 0.029 0.028 
 [0.041] [0.041] [0.047] [0.047] [0.043] [0.043] 
Radical innovation 0.135** 0.134** 0.269*** 0.268*** 0.105 0.104 
 [0.068] [0.068] [0.076] [0.076] [0.072] [0.072] 
Org innovation 0.308*** 0.308*** 0.513*** 0.515*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 
 [0.068] [0.068] [0.079] [0.080] [0.073] [0.073] 
Number of R&D researchers 0.046 0.054 -0.009 0.012 0.098 0.099 
 [0.058] [0.059] [0.064] [0.064] [0.061] [0.062] 
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Wald Χ2 127.516[19]*** 127.76[20]*** 172.709[19]*** 175.43[20]*** 90.861[19]*** 90.96[20]*** 
Firm-period observations 2226 2226 2226 2226 2226 2226 
Firm observations 4191 4191 4191 4191 4191 4191 
Random effects probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. The degrees of freedom of Wald χ2 test for the overall significance of 
variables are reported in parentheses. Dummies for Pavitt (1984) four categories of industrial firms are included (but not shown) in all regressions. Year dummies are not 
included as the joint test of significance is never rejected at the standard confidence levels. Dependent variable is the probability to fail in any phase in columns 1-2, the 
probability to fail at the conception phase in columns 3-4 and the probability to fail at the implementation phase in columns 5-6. Base sample in all columns is an unbalanced 
panel, 2009-2012, with data at 3-year intervals in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., if t=2007-2009, so t-1=2004-2006). * p<0.10, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 6 Innovation failures determinants: curvilinear effects 
 Failure overall Failure conception Failure implementation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
R&D exploration 0.146*** 0.206*** 0.121*** 
 [0.040] [0.046] [0.044] 
R&D exploration sq -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.012** 
 [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] 
R&D exploitation 0.021* 0.032** 0.001 
 [0.012] [0.014] [0.012] 
Knowledge breadth 0.014 0.063*** 0.008 
 [0.012] [0.014] [0.012] 
Knowledge depth 0.019 0.037 0.017 
 [0.023] [0.025] [0.024] 
Other innovation expenditures 0.006 0.006 0.004 
 [0.014] [0.016] [0.015] 
Firm age 0.146** 0.105 0.120 
 [0.068] [0.077] [0.073] 
Group 0.054 0.039 0.146 
 [0.086] [0.097] [0.090] 
Cost barriers -0.086 -0.136 -0.109 
 [0.092] [0.107] [0.098] 
Knowledge barriers 0.230 0.326 0.311 
 [0.306] [0.343] [0.313] 
Market barriers - uncertainty 0.218*** 0.133 0.247*** 
 [0.081] [0.092] [0.084] 
Market barriers - dominated 0.102 0.179* 0.028 
 [0.090] [0.103] [0.096] 
Number of employees 0.018 0.020 -0.004 
 [0.042] [0.049] [0.045] 
Radical innovation 0.135** 0.269*** 0.106 
 [0.067] [0.075] [0.072] 
Org innovation 0.308*** 0.512*** 0.208*** 
 [0.068] [0.079] [0.072] 
Number of R&D researchers 0.109* 0.073 0.153** 
 [0.061] [0.068] [0.065] 
Wald Χ2 133.07[19]*** 181.62[19]*** 93.71[19]*** 
Firm-period observations 2226 2226 2226 
Firm observations 4191 4191 4191 
Random effects probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. The degrees 
of freedom of Wald χ2 test for the overall significance of variables are reported in parentheses. Dummies for 
Pavitt (1984) four categories of industrial firms are included (but not shown) in all regressions. Year dummies 
are not included as the joint test of significance is never rejected at the standard confidence levels. Dependent 
variable is the probability to fail in any phase in column 1, the probability to fail at the conception phase in 
column 2 and the probability to fail at the implementation phase in column 3. Base sample in all columns is an 
unbalanced panel, 2009-2012, with data at 3-year intervals in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the 
dependent variable (i.e., if t=2007-2009, so t-1=2004-2006). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A1: Proportion of companies experiencing failure (overall, conception and 
implementation) for different types of innovation-related activities 
Types of innovation-related activities Failure  
overall 
Failure  
conception 
Failure  
implementation 
Total 
Intramural R&D (only) 27.94% 20.83% 17.52% 816 
Other innovation activities (only) 19.33% 10.33% 13.33% 600 
Both 34.62% 27.62% 22.68% 4052 
The category “other innovation activities” include the following: extramural R&D; Acquisition of machinery, 
equipment and software; Acquisition of other external knowledge; Training; Market introduction of innovations; 
Other preparations 
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Table A2: Innovation failures determinants: past exploration in stock 
 Failure overall Failure conception Failure implementation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
R&D exploration 0.041*** 0.050*** 0.060*** 0.088*** 0.030** 0.032* 
 [0.011] [0.018] [0.013] [0.021] [0.012] [0.019] 
R&D exploration stock -1 0.008 0.015 0.007 0.031* 0.007 0.009 
 [0.010] [0.014] [0.012] [0.017] [0.011] [0.015] 
R&D exploration X R&D exploration stock -1  -0.002  -0.005*  -0.000 
  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
R&D exploitation 0.027** 0.026** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.006 0.006 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.012] 
Knowledge breadth 0.013 0.013 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.008 0.008 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] 
Knowledge depth 0.019 0.019 0.036 0.038 0.016 0.017 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.025] [0.026] [0.024] [0.024] 
Other innovation expenditures 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] 
Firm age 0.151** 0.151** 0.113 0.113 0.124* 0.124* 
 [0.068] [0.068] [0.077] [0.077] [0.074] [0.074] 
Group 0.040 0.041 0.021 0.022 0.136 0.136 
 [0.086] [0.086] [0.098] [0.098] [0.091] [0.091] 
Cost barriers -0.083 -0.085 -0.129 -0.134 -0.107 -0.107 
 [0.093] [0.093] [0.108] [0.108] [0.099] [0.099] 
Knowledge barriers 0.234 0.235 0.331 0.336 0.317 0.317 
 [0.308] [0.308] [0.345] [0.345] [0.316] [0.316] 
Market barriers - uncertainty 0.226*** 0.227*** 0.146 0.151 0.256*** 0.257*** 
 [0.081] [0.081] [0.093] [0.093] [0.084] [0.084] 
Market barriers - dominated 0.101 0.101 0.177* 0.178* 0.028 0.028 
 [0.091] [0.091] [0.104] [0.104] [0.097] [0.097] 
Number of employees 0.054 0.053 0.070 0.067 0.027 0.027 
 [0.041] [0.041] [0.047] [0.047] [0.043] [0.043] 
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Radical innovation 0.135** 0.135** 0.269*** 0.268*** 0.105 0.105 
 [0.068] [0.068] [0.076] [0.076] [0.072] [0.072] 
Org innovation 0.310*** 0.311*** 0.514*** 0.518*** 0.211*** 0.212*** 
 [0.068] [0.068] [0.079] [0.079] [0.073] [0.073] 
Number of R&D researchers 0.048 0.054 -0.009 0.008 0.100 0.101 
 [0.059] [0.059] [0.064] [0.065] [0.061] [0.062] 
Wald Χ2 127.07[19]*** 127.29[20]*** 172.64[19]*** 174.71[20]*** 90.54[19]*** 90.6[20]*** 
Firm-period observations 2226 2226 2226 2226 2226 2226 
Firm observations 4191 4191 4191 4191 4191 4191 
Random effects probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. The degrees of freedom of Wald χ2 test for the overall significance of 
variables are reported in parentheses. Dummies for Pavitt (1984) four categories of industrial firms are included (but not shown) in all regressions. Year dummies are not 
included as the joint test of significance is never rejected at the standard confidence levels. Dependent variable is the probability to fail in any phase in columns 1-2, the 
probability to fail at the conception phase in columns 3-4 and the probability to fail at the implementation phase in columns 5-6. Base sample in all columns is an unbalanced 
panel, 2009-2012, with data at 3-year intervals in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., if t=2007-2009, so t-1=2004-2006). * p<0.10, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A3: Innovation failures determinants: current exploration activities for SMEs 
(less than 50 employees) 
 Failure overall Failure conception Failure implementation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
R&D exploration 0.037*** 0.047*** 0.036** 
 [0.014] [0.015] [0.015] 
R&D exploitation 0.024 0.024 0.010 
 [0.015] [0.018] [0.017] 
Knowledge breadth -0.009 0.036* -0.010 
 [0.017] [0.019] [0.019] 
Knowledge depth 0.013 0.007 0.027 
 [0.035] [0.039] [0.038] 
Other innovation expenditures -0.012 -0.010 -0.009 
 [0.019] [0.022] [0.021] 
Firm age 0.165 0.236** 0.056 
 [0.105] [0.118] [0.122] 
Group -0.027 0.004 0.006 
 [0.135] [0.153] [0.153] 
Cost barriers -0.175 -0.188 -0.268** 
 [0.120] [0.137] [0.134] 
Knowledge barriers 0.302 0.527 0.340 
 [0.334] [0.344] [0.367] 
Market barriers - uncertainty 0.340*** 0.235* 0.346*** 
 [0.115] [0.129] [0.125] 
Market barriers - dominated 0.155 0.185 0.128 
 [0.125] [0.139] [0.140] 
Number of employees -0.129 -0.166 -0.105 
 [0.094] [0.110] [0.106] 
Radical innovation 0.133 0.294*** 0.025 
 [0.100] [0.109] [0.111] 
Org innovation 0.233** 0.411*** 0.155 
 [0.097] [0.110] [0.107] 
Number of R&D researchers 0.008 0.143 0.053 
 [0.126] [0.135] [0.138] 
Wald Χ2 52.6[18]*** 70.23[18]*** 33.52[18]** 
Firm-period observations 1000 1000 1000 
Firm observations 1805 1805 1805 
Random effects probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. The degrees 
of freedom of Wald χ2 test for the overall significance of variables are reported in parentheses. Dummies for 
Pavitt (1984) four categories of industrial firms are included (but not shown) in all regressions. Year dummies 
are not included as the joint test of significance is never rejected at the standard confidence levels. Dependent 
variable is the probability to fail in any phase in column 1, the probability to fail at the conception phase in 
column 2 and the probability to fail at the implementation phase in column 3. Base sample in all columns is an 
unbalanced panel, 2009-2012, with data at 3-year intervals in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the 
dependent variable (i.e., if t=2007-2009, so t-1=2004-2006). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A4: Innovation failures determinants: interaction effects for SMEs (less than 50 employees) 
 Failure overall Failure conception Failure implementation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
R&D exploration 0.034** 0.059*** 0.047*** 0.079*** 0.031* 0.044* 
 [0.015] [0.023] [0.017] [0.026] [0.016] [0.025] 
R&D exploration -1 0.007 0.029 -0.001 0.029 0.011 0.023 
 [0.015] [0.021] [0.017] [0.024] [0.017] [0.024] 
R&D exploration X R&D exploration -1  -0.005  -0.007*  -0.003 
  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
R&D exploitation 0.024 0.022 0.024 0.021 0.010 0.009 
 [0.018] [0.016] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] 
Knowledge breadth 0.036* -0.009 0.036* 0.036* -0.010 -0.010 
 [0.019] [0.017] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
Knowledge depth 0.007 0.015 0.007 0.010 0.028 0.028 
 [0.039] [0.035] [0.039] [0.039] [0.038] [0.038] 
Other innovation expenditures -0.010 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 [0.022] [0.019] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.021] 
Firm age 0.236** 0.170 0.236** 0.240** 0.059 0.060 
 [0.118] [0.105] [0.118] [0.118] [0.122] [0.122] 
Group 0.004 -0.029 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 [0.153] [0.135] [0.153] [0.153] [0.153] [0.153] 
Cost barriers -0.188 -0.174 -0.188 -0.183 -0.272** -0.270** 
 [0.137] [0.120] [0.137] [0.137] [0.135] [0.134] 
Knowledge barriers 0.527 0.310 0.528 0.542 0.337 0.343 
 [0.344] [0.335] [0.345] [0.345] [0.367] [0.367] 
Market barriers - uncertainty 0.235* 0.341*** 0.235* 0.237* 0.348*** 0.347*** 
 [0.129] [0.115] [0.129] [0.129] [0.126] [0.125] 
Market barriers - dominated 0.185 0.160 0.184 0.190 0.131 0.133 
 [0.139] [0.125] [0.139] [0.139] [0.140] [0.140] 
Number of employees -0.166 -0.134 -0.166 -0.179 -0.100 -0.104 
 [0.110] [0.094] [0.110] [0.111] [0.107] [0.107] 
Radical innovation 0.294*** 0.134 0.294*** 0.296*** 0.025 0.025 
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 [0.109] [0.100] [0.110] [0.109] [0.112] [0.111] 
Org innovation 0.411*** 0.234** 0.412*** 0.414*** 0.151 0.153 
 [0.110] [0.097] [0.110] [0.110] [0.108] [0.107] 
Number of R&D researchers 0.143 0.026 0.144 0.174 0.043 0.056 
 [0.135] [0.127] [0.136] [0.137] [0.140] [0.140] 
Wald Χ2 70.23[18]*** 53.89[20]*** 70.46[19]*** 72.71[20]*** 33.31[19]** 33.69[20]*** 
Firm-period observations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Firm observations 1805 1805 1805 1805 1805 1805 
Random effects probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. The degrees of freedom of Wald χ2 test for the overall significance of 
variables are reported in parentheses. Dummies for Pavitt (1984) four categories of industrial firms are included (but not shown) in all regressions. Year dummies are not 
included as the joint test of significance is never rejected at the standard confidence levels. Dependent variable is the probability to fail in any phase in columns 1-2, the 
probability to fail at the conception phase in columns 3-4 and the probability to fail at the implementation phase in columns 5-6. Base sample in all columns is an unbalanced 
panel, 2009-2012, with data at 3-year intervals in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., if t=2007-2009, so t-1=2004-2006). * p<0.10, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A5: Innovation failures determinants: curvilinear effects for SMEs (less than 50 
employees) 
 Failure overall Failure conception Failure implementation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
R&D exploration 0.163*** 0.201*** 0.206*** 
 [0.060] [0.070] [0.068] 
R&D exploration sq -0.016** -0.020** -0.022*** 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] 
R&D exploitation 0.018 0.017 0.002 
 [0.016] [0.018] [0.017] 
Knowledge breadth -0.006 0.038** -0.006 
 [0.017] [0.019] [0.019] 
Knowledge depth 0.016 0.011 0.030 
 [0.035] [0.039] [0.038] 
Other innovation expenditures -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 
 [0.020] [0.022] [0.022] 
Firm age 0.161 0.230** 0.049 
 [0.104] [0.116] [0.120] 
Group -0.020 0.009 0.016 
 [0.135] [0.152] [0.153] 
Cost barriers -0.177 -0.188 -0.271** 
 [0.119] [0.135] [0.133] 
Knowledge barriers 0.308 0.530 0.344 
 [0.330] [0.338] [0.361] 
Market barriers - uncertainty 0.326*** 0.214* 0.325*** 
 [0.115] [0.129] [0.125] 
Market barriers - dominated 0.166 0.198 0.142 
 [0.125] [0.138] [0.139] 
Number of employees -0.178* -0.225** -0.174 
 [0.096] [0.113] [0.109] 
Radical innovation 0.135 0.295*** 0.027 
 [0.100] [0.108] [0.111] 
Org innovation 0.229** 0.407*** 0.146 
 [0.097] [0.108] [0.107] 
Number of R&D researchers 0.100 0.256* 0.179 
 [0.133] [0.144] [0.147] 
Wald Χ2 58.36[19]*** 75.76[19]*** 40.02[19] 
Firm-period observations 1000 1000 1000 
Firm observations 1805 1805 1805 
Random effects probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. The degrees 
of freedom of Wald χ2 test for the overall significance of variables are reported in parentheses. Dummies for 
Pavitt (1984) four categories of industrial firms are included (but not shown) in all regressions. Year dummies 
are not included as the joint test of significance is never rejected at the standard confidence levels. Dependent 
variable is the probability to fail in any phase in column 1, the probability to fail at the conception phase in 
column 2 and the probability to fail at the implementation phase in column 3. Base sample in all columns is an 
unbalanced panel, 2009-2012, with data at 3-year intervals in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the 
dependent variable (i.e., if t=2007-2009, so t-1=2004-2006). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A6: Innovation failures determinants: Bivariate probit regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Failure 
conception 
Failure 
implementation 
Failure 
conception 
Failure 
implementation 
Failure 
conception 
Failure 
implementation 
Failure 
conception 
Failure 
implementation 
R&D exploration 0.037*** 0.022*** 0.034*** 0.019** 0.050*** 0.028** 0.146*** 0.103*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.012] [0.012] [0.029] [0.030] 
R&D Exploration -1   0.006 0.005 0.023** 0.014   
   [0.008] [0.008] [0.012] [0.012]   
R&D exploration X 
R&D Exploration -1 
    -0.004** -0.002   
     [0.002] [0.002]   
R&D exploration sq       -0.014*** -0.011*** 
       [0.004] [0.004] 
R&D exploitation 0.022*** -0.001 0.022*** -0.001 0.020** -0.002 0.016* -0.005 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] 
Knowledge breadth 0.042*** 0.012 0.041*** 0.012 0.041*** 0.012 0.042*** 0.012 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] 
Knowledge depth 0.012 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.013 0.001 0.012 0.001 
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] 
Other innovation 
expenditures 
-0.007 -0.004 -0.007 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 0.000 0.002 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] 
Firm age 0.079* 0.097** 0.079* 0.096** 0.079* 0.097** 0.073 0.092* 
 [0.048] [0.049] [0.048] [0.049] [0.048] [0.049] [0.047] [0.049] 
Group 0.014 0.083 0.013 0.082 0.014 0.083 0.027 0.092 
 [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] 
Cost barriers -0.072 -0.080 -0.072 -0.081 -0.074 -0.082 -0.076 -0.083 
 [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] 
Knowledge barriers 0.073 0.150 0.071 0.148 0.076 0.151 0.071 0.147 
 [0.215] [0.213] [0.215] [0.213] [0.214] [0.214] [0.214] [0.213] 
Market barriers - 
uncertainty 
0.138** 0.205*** 0.139** 0.206*** 0.140** 0.206*** 0.130** 0.199*** 
 [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.059] [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] 
Market barriers - 
dominated 
0.110* 0.059 0.112* 0.060 0.115* 0.062 0.114* 0.061 
 [0.065] [0.067] [0.066] [0.067] [0.066] [0.067] [0.065] [0.067] 
Number of employees 0.040 0.014 0.042 0.016 0.038 0.013 0.005 -0.011 
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 [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030] [0.030] 
Radical innovation 0.213*** 0.095* 0.212*** 0.094* 0.213*** 0.094* 0.215*** 0.096* 
 [0.049] [0.051] [0.049] [0.051] [0.049] [0.051] [0.049] [0.051] 
Org innovation 0.335*** 0.161*** 0.334*** 0.160*** 0.334*** 0.160*** 0.330*** 0.157*** 
 [0.050] [0.051] [0.050] [0.051] [0.050] [0.051] [0.050] [0.051] 
Number of R&D 
researchers 
-0.009 0.073* -0.013 0.069* 0.001 0.077* 0.049 0.116*** 
 [0.040] [0.041] [0.040] [0.042] [0.041] [0.042] [0.043] [0.044] 
Wald Χ2 285.16(36)*** 285.43(38)*** 285.71[40]*** 299.24[38]*** 
Firm-period 
observations 
2226 2226 2226 2226 
Firm observations 4191 4191 4191 4191 
Bivariate probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. The degrees of freedom of Wald χ2 test for the overall significance of variables 
are reported in parentheses. Dummies for Pavitt (1984) four categories of industrial firms are included (but not shown) in all regressions. Year dummies are not included as 
the joint test of significance is never rejected at the standard confidence levels. Dependent variable is the probability to fail at the conception phase in even and the probability 
to fail at the implementation phase in odd columns. Base sample in all columns is a cross-section (2004-2012). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A7: Innovation failures determinants: Probit Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Failure 
conception 
Failure 
implementation 
Failure 
conception 
Failure 
implementation 
Failure 
conception 
Failure 
implementation 
Failure 
conception 
Failure 
implementation 
R&D exploration 0.037*** 0.022*** 0.034*** 0.019** 0.050*** 0.028** 0.146*** 0.103*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.012] [0.012] [0.029] [0.030] 
R&D Exploration -1   0.006 0.005 0.023** 0.014   
   [0.008] [0.008] [0.012] [0.012]   
R&D exploration X 
R&D Exploration -1 
    -0.004** -0.002   
     [0.002] [0.002]   
R&D exploration sq       -0.014*** -0.011*** 
       [0.004] [0.004] 
R&D exploitation 0.022*** -0.001 0.022*** -0.001 0.020** -0.002 0.016* -0.005 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] 
Knowledge breadth 0.042*** 0.012 0.041*** 0.012 0.041*** 0.012 0.042*** 0.012 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] 
Knowledge depth 0.012 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.013 0.001 0.012 0.001 
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] 
Other innovation 
expenditures 
-0.007 -0.004 -0.007 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 0.000 0.002 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] 
Firm age 0.079* 0.097** 0.079* 0.096** 0.079* 0.097** 0.073 0.092* 
 [0.048] [0.049] [0.048] [0.049] [0.048] [0.049] [0.047] [0.049] 
Group 0.014 0.083 0.013 0.082 0.014 0.083 0.027 0.092 
 [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.061] 
Cost barriers -0.072 -0.080 -0.072 -0.081 -0.074 -0.082 -0.076 -0.083 
 [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] 
Knowledge barriers 0.073 0.150 0.071 0.148 0.076 0.151 0.071 0.147 
 [0.215] [0.213] [0.215] [0.213] [0.214] [0.214] [0.214] [0.213] 
Market barriers - 
uncertainty 
0.138** 0.205*** 0.139** 0.206*** 0.140** 0.206*** 0.130** 0.199*** 
 [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.059] [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] 
Market barriers - 
dominated 
0.110* 0.059 0.112* 0.060 0.115* 0.062 0.114* 0.061 
 [0.065] [0.067] [0.066] [0.067] [0.066] [0.067] [0.065] [0.067] 
Number of employees 0.040 0.014 0.042 0.016 0.038 0.013 0.005 -0.011 
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 [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030] [0.030] 
Radical innovation 0.213*** 0.095* 0.212*** 0.094* 0.213*** 0.094* 0.215*** 0.096* 
 [0.049] [0.051] [0.049] [0.051] [0.049] [0.051] [0.049] [0.051] 
Org innovation 0.335*** 0.161*** 0.334*** 0.160*** 0.334*** 0.160*** 0.330*** 0.157*** 
 [0.050] [0.051] [0.050] [0.051] [0.050] [0.051] [0.050] [0.051] 
Number of R&D 
researchers 
-0.009 0.073* -0.013 0.069* 0.001 0.077* 0.049 0.116*** 
 [0.040] [0.041] [0.040] [0.042] [0.041] [0.042] [0.043] [0.044] 
Wald Χ2 285.16[36]*** 285.43[38]*** 285.71[40]*** 299.24[38]*** 
Firm-period 
observations 
2226 2226 2226 2226 
Firm observations 4191 4191 4191 4191 
Probit SURE with robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. The degrees of freedom of Wald Χ2 test for the overall significance of variables are reported in 
parentheses. Dummies for Pavitt (1984) four categories of industrial firms are included (but not shown) in all regressions and Wald Χ2 test is reported with the joint 
significance. Year dummies are not included as the joint test of significance is never rejected at the standard confidence levels. Dependent variable is the probability to fail at 
the conception phase in odd columns and the probability to fail at the implementation phase in even columns. Base sample in all columns is an unbalanced panel, 2009-2012, 
with data at 3-year intervals in levels where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., if t=2007-2009, so t-1=2004-2006). 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
63 
 
